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powers of reasoning and the mechanic’s technical knowledge the prophetic art which
draws us to follow the guidance of Fate” (13.4.81-2). Maximus’ point is that God
only operates the machinery; and rather than being omnipotent as the Judaeo-
Christian God is often perceived as being, He is severely limited by what the machin-
ery can actually accomplish.
The Divine Architect
The Demiurge posited by the first century exegete, Philo Judaeus is upwardly-mobi-
le with a promotion from craftsman to architect. Such an elevation involves more
than social prejudice, however. While Plato had posited three principles: God (the
Demiurge), the Ideas and matter from which everything else has its being, by Philo’s
time the Ideas or intelligible archetypes according to which sensible reality is orde-
red had become regarded as merely the thoughts of God. This leads Philo to introdu-
ce his famous comparison of the Demiurge with a king founding a city at Opif. 17.
Once the king has decided upon construction, the architect mentally draws up the
plans. The means by which he replicates this mental conception in the material realm
echoes what the Demiurge accomplishes.1 The Logos, then, contains the noetic realm,
as the mind of the Demiurge, but it is not true to state that it has a physical place.2
This is the world of Ideas as God is actually engaged in creation, but as Philo consi-
ders God as continually engaging in the process of creation, no fine distinction need
be made concerning this point.3
Philo blurs the distinction between the king and the architect as an attempt
to preserve God’s transcendence. Another reason may be that he did not wish to open
speculation concerning an ontological chain of demiurgic intermediaries. It indicates
that the function of Demiurge does not exhaust God’s being – it is only one of his
roles. The Demiurge for Philo is subsumed into the Judaic god and the Logos-Cutter
which He employs to carry out his demiurgic function is a subordinate entity, allow-
ing Philo to resolve the supposed contradictions between both generative models.
Secondly, Philo presents the architect as envisaging the future city mentally, when in
point of fact he would use written plans - however this would not suit Philo’s con-
tention that the intelligible realm does not occupy physical space. 
The Logos-Cutter
Allotting tools to the Demiurge goes beyond producing a comprehensible image of
world-generation or explaining the mechanism of causality. It helps to insulate the
Demiurge from the recalcitrance of matter, thereby reducing his responsibility for the
element of disorder in the world.  Such “tools” differ from the machine of Maximus
in that they are philosophical entities in their own right, or “hypostases”, aspects of
the Godhead that enjoy an independent existence. Philo posits the Logos (Word)-
Cutter. The image of the Logos as a tool is one of the predominant images presented
by Philo in order to cast light on its functioning in the creation of the world.
Additionally, the Logos can also be presented as a mediating entity. The image of the
Introduction
In the biblical accounts of creation (Gen. 1:1 -2:4a and Gen. 2:4bff), it is enough for
God to will something to be created for this to happen. The second account may refer
to God as a potter or builder, but it still differs significantly from Plato’s Timaeus,
where the world is generated by the Demiurge (Greek = Craftsman) who has to lite-
rally toil at the task of ordering the cosmos; an image which was something of an
embarrassment for generations of later Platonists. As the Epicurean of ND I. 19 moc-
kingly states: “What power of mental vision allowed your master Plato to envisage
the vast and elaborate architectural process adopted by God in constructing the
world? What method of engineering was employed? What iron tools and levers and
cranes?” (trans. LCL modified). 
Indeed, if God is truly a Craftsman, He must be provided with tools with
which to construct the world. These “tools” are not more than mere stylistic devices.
Although used for the purposes of exposition, they tend to have an insulating func-
tion by effectively separating the first principle from matter. Plato describes the
Demiurge sorting out the elements with the aid of a winnowing-fan, an image that
probably suggested itself to him from the sieve posited by Democritus, the atomist.
The second century A.D. Platonist, Maximus of Tyre developed a still more elaborate
image:
As to the nature of this divine craft, I am unable to describe it to
you explicitly, but you will be able to understand its effects from
an image of the kind I shall now give you. You have surely
before now seen ships being hauled up out of the sea and stones
of enormous bulk being moved by all sorts of twistings and
rotations of machinery as each component transmits its impetus
to the next and one component receives the movement from
another, the whole machine is set in motion. It is the whole
machine that is responsible for achieving the task, but by means
of the collaboration of its individual parts. (Oration 13, trans.
Trapp)
Maximus’ vision here goes beyond mere imagery. He seeks to expound the
causality of the Demiurge in terms of its relation to limiting factors, such as Necessity
and Providence. As he elaborates: “Call the mechanic God, the machines human
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ed our soul and limbs in the middle, so too when he wrought the
world, did he deal with the being of all that is.7
This notion of the Logos engaged in division is central to Philo’s notion of
world-creation. It is hardly surprising that it is the Logos which is engaged in this sort
of activity, as the human mind, which Philo also describes as a Logos, is occupied
with much the same function on a smaller scale, when it is engaged in diaresis.8 Heres
134 continues this concept of a creative division on the part of the Logos, based
around the four main elements.
This He took and began to divide as follows. First He made two sec-
tions, heavy and light, thus distinguishing the element of dense from
that of rare particles. Then again He divides each of these two, the
rare into air and fire, the dense into water and land and these four he
laid down as first foundations to be the sensible elements of the sen-
sible world.
The first task of the Logos-Cutter is division based on the elements. The activ-
ity of the Logos here parallels very closely the ordering through differentiation
engaged in by the Demiurge of the Timaeus.9 It is interesting that in spite of a certain
adoption of Stoic elements, a great deal of Philo’s exposition of the Logos-Cutter is
expressed in terms generic to all the schools. Certainly Stoic, however, is the division
of fire into two kinds at § 136; the useful variety and what amounts to the Stoic pyr
technikon (fire as the basic substrate which survives the end of each world-order), set
aside to preserve the heavens.10
At Heres 140, Philo makes it quite clear that God is the true Demiurge and
the Logos is merely the means or tool by which He creates, rather than some kind of
independently operating agent.
Thus God sharpened the edge of His all-cutting Word, and divided
universal being, which before was without form or quality, and the
four elements of the world which were formed by segregation from
it, and the animals and plants which were framed with them as mate-
rials.
The Being which God divides here is ousia or the Stoic conception of matter,
although God is envisaged as ordering, rather than creating. The continual division of
matter by the Logos can be viewed as Philo’s version of the continual geometry
engaged in by the Demiurge at Plutarch’s Quaest. Conviv. 1002E, stressed at Heres
235 (quoted below), where the Logos is said to never cease to cleave matter. The pas-
sage describes the Logos as dividing matter into an infinity of infinities; for Philo,
there was no such thing as an atom in the philosophical sense- it was always possi-
Logos as a cutter might well have suggested itself to Philo from the flaming sword of
the Cherubim at Gen. 3:24, once Philo had equated this with the Logos (a concept
that preceded Philo). This notion can be paralleled in Gnosticism, with examples
found in the Nag Hammadi texts. According to The Testimony of Truth 9.3, it is the
Word (logos) which separates us from the error of the angels, where it is associated
with the incarnate Son of Man. In The Teaching of Silvanus, the Logos is also regar-
ded as a cutting-agent¸ and identification with the incarnate Christ is made explicit.
The Gospel of Truth compares the Logos to a drawn sword. However, just as in The
Teaching of Silvanus, this cutting-action has a soteriological, rather than a demiurgic
significance, evoking the Johannine conception of Incarnation with the Word
condemning some and saving others. 
This portrayal of the Logos as a saw or sword may either be influenced in
some way (directly or indirectly) by Philo, or indicate a current in Judaeo-Christian
philosophical thought, which Philo himself adopted. As Hay claims, it seems likely
that the conception of the Logos in a cosmological sense originated with Philo,
although he may have drawn upon the Jewish tradition’s view of the divine word as
a sword used for protection of the faithful and punishment of the wicked.4 The Logos-
Cutter can be viewed as a Jewish response within the current of Greek philosophy,
which attempted to explain the imposition of order upon a disordered universe, using
figures such as Hermes or Osiris as a personification of divine wisdom. As a divine
mediator, the Logos appears at Poimandres 10 -11 and at Plutarch’s De Iside et
Osiride (53 – 54, 372E – 373C). Eudorus (of Alexandria) may also have expressed
the combination of the monad (indivisible first principle) and dyad (divisible sec-
ondary principle) as the thought or Logos of a supreme One.5 Tobin suggests that the
Logos in Philo may reflect an element from the early stages of Alexandrian Middle
Platonism, ignored by subsequent thinkers.6
A useful source for Philo’s doctrine of the Logos-Cutter is his commentary
Quis Rerum Divinarum Heres (“Who is the Heir of Divine Things?”), an exegesis of
Gen. 15:2-18, concerning Abraham’s sacrifice of the heifer, ram and birds. Although
the concept of the Logos-Cutter is only fully developed in Heres, at Fug. et. Inv. 194-
196, it is mentioned as a Divider. In an interesting philosophical insight, Philo por-
trays Yahweh as the inventor of Platonic diairesis (philosophical investigation, divi-
sion) by which he differentiates the various levels of the created realm. At Heres 132,
Philo refers to Abraham’s division of his sacrifice as symbolic of the Logos’ division
of our consciousness into rational and irrational soul, true and false speech and cog-
nitive and non-cognitive impressions. At Heres 133, Philo signals the link between
diairesis and demiurgy:
The subject of division into equal parts and of opposites is a
wide one and discussion of it is essential. We will neither omit
nor protract it, but abridge it as far as possible and content our-
selves with the vital points only. Just as the great Artificer divid-
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The description here is very similar to the construction of the heavens and the
insertion of the World-Soul at Timaeus 35. Although Philo dispenses with the World-
Soul, which becomes largely replaced by the Logos, he is prepared to adopt the
imagery of the Timaeus for his own purposes.11 Dillon suggests that Philo may be
using a Stoic handbook in delineating his concept of the Logos.12 In this context, he
cites the presentation of Antiochus of Ascalon in Cicero’s Academica Posteriora,
where mention is made of an infinite “cutting” and “dividing” of matter.13 However,
Cicero does not go into details of how this division contributes to the organisation of
matter.
This pronouncement of theirs is not wide of the mark. Judge that the
master art of God by which He wrought all things is one that admits
of no heightening or lowering of intensity but always remains the
same and that through its transcendent excellence it has wrought in
perfection each theory that is, every number and every form that
tends to perfectness being used to the full by the Maker. (Heres 156)
Just like his Platonic predecessor, the Philonic Demiurge constructs the world based
on significant numbers, which reveals the perfection of the cosmos. It is this that
allows Philo to explain in philosophical terms creation in six/seven days –obviously
there is no reason why an omnipotent deity should require a week to create the cos-
mos, since he would be capable, as Philo asserts, of creating it simultaneously- how-
ever, the importance of six and seven underline the perfection of what was created
(both are philosophically important numbers in Greek thought, while seven is impor-
tant in Judaism as it represents a complete whole). This perfection of the created
world is evoked by the menorah.14
At Heres 157, it is evident the cosmos as a whole is good:
For He judged equally about the little and the great to use Moses’
words (Deut.1.17) when He generated and sliced each thing nor was
He led by the insignificance of the material to diminish, or by its
splendour to increase, the art which He applied.
There can be no question of the recalcitrance of matter as an explanation of the exis-
tence of evil in the created realm: Philo’s God, like the Platonic Demiurge, made the
best kind of world possible, but unlike him, was in no way limited by the materials
which He used. The prejudicial Platonic view of matter does come across at Heres
158, although not as a limitation on God’s bounty. Rather, matter is not responsible
for the beauty of the cosmos, which must be attributed to the superior science of the
Demiurge.15 At Heres 163, Philo indicates that in spite of what humans might think
there is no dichotomy between an inferior or superior part of creation:
ble, even if only for the Logos, to subdivide matter eternally. 
The Greek oudepote here, I would suggest, could be taken as “at no point”
as well as “never”; the Logos never ceases to divide matter in the temporal sense, but
equally in its continual care for the phenomenal realm, it is capable of infinite divi-
sion, or at least to a point beyond that which can be comprehended by the human
mind.
This notion of the Logos as a tool is echoed in a similar passage at §167:
“these tables too were cut by the Divine Legislator and by Him only.” This notion of
cutting suggests that the thought of God can be equated with the Logos-Cutter. The
passage helps to reinforce the notion of the Logos-Cutter as an instrument of the
Demiurge, since the identification of a legislator with a Demiurge is an old one, as
both can be regarded as imposing order upon disorder. Although Philo’s image of the
Logos-Cutter appears to be a unique contribution, Heres 146 reveals how much he
owes to the Demiurge of the Timaeus:
In the light of this preliminary sketch observe how God in “dividing
in the middle” actually did divide equally according to all forms of
equality, when he created the universe. First, as to equality of num-
ber, he made the light parts equal in number to the heavy parts, earth
and water, which are heavy being two, and fire and air, which are nat-
urally light being two also. Again by this division we have one and
one in the driest and the wettest, that is earth and water, and in the
coldest and the hottest, that is air and fire. In the same way, we have
one and one in darkness and light, in day and night, in winter and
summer, in spring and autumn, and in the other examples of the same
nature.
This activity is similar to the separating action of the Receptacle. The stress on divi-
sion based on equality (i.e. rational principles) echoes the mixing together of the
Same and the Different – Philo points to the rationality visible in the cosmos, as evi-
dence that it must have been created by a rational principle. This is echoed in the
description of the equitable construction of the heavens at Heres 147: 
For equality of the magnitude, he gave us the parallel circles in heav-
en, those of the equinox in spring and autumn, and those of the sol-
stice in summer and winter, while on earth there are the zones two of
which are equal to each other, namely those which adjoin the poles,
frigid and therefore uninhabited, and two which are bordered by the
last named and torrid zone, these two habitable, as we are told,
because of their temperate climate, one of them on the south side and
the other on the north.
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187-188, where he refers to the Logos as a bond holding together creation, though he
uses the terms kolla (glue, cement) and desmos (bond,ligature), rather than the more
Stoic hexis (cohesion):
And a unit admits neither of addition nor subtraction, being the
image of God who is alone in His unity and has fullness. Other
things are in themselves without coherence and if they be con-
densed, it is because they are held tight by the divine Word,
which is a glue and bond, filling up all things with His being.
He who fastens and weaves together each separate thing is a lit-
eral truth full of his own self, and needs nothing else at all.
This echoes the portrayal of the Logos at De Plantatione 7-10, as a bond holding
together opposites. There is an interesting parallel in the pseudo-Aristotelian De
mundo, where Nature is regarded as responsible for the harmony of opposites.xvii As
in Philo, Heraclitus is regarded as the originator of this concept. Although no exact
parallel of the Philonic Logos-Cutter (in a demiurgic sense) prior to Philo can be
found, Heraclitus does mention a spiritual principle bounded by fire which he calls
logos, and which contributes to world-order by combining opposites rather like
Philo’s Logos at Heres 199:
And the mixture thus harmoniously compounded proves to be
that most venerable and perfect work, a work in very truth holy,
even the world, which he holds under the symbol of the incense
offering, gives thanks to its Maker, so that while in outward
speech it is the compound formed by the perfumer’s art which
is burnt as incense, in real fact it is the whole world, wrought by
divine wisdom, which in fact is offered and consumed morning
and evening in the sacrificial fire.
This image of a cosmic mixture produced by the Demiurge could easily be inspired
by Plato. However, Philo stresses that this mixture is harmonious, which is clearly not
the case in the Timaeus, compounded as it is of the passive and the recalcitrant
(Sameness and Different). Indeed, at Heres 214 and QG. III 5, Philo points out that
Heraclitus’ cosmology shares similarities with that of Moses. In the Hermetic tradi-
tion there is also a Logos-Cutter of sorts; Poimandres, who produces the cosmos
through differentiation, and Hermes who is a combined Truth and Logos figure.
Philo’s mention of Heraclitus does not indicate that he was father of a doctrine
involving the Logos-Cutter. One can only conclude that the Logos-Cutter is an orig-
inal contribution of Philo’s or he acquired it from a Hellenistic Jewish source (as
there does not appear to be any exact counterpart to this before him in the Greek
philosophical tradition).
But with God no kind of material is held in honour and there-
fore he bestowed upon them all the same art and in equal meas-
ure. And so in the holy Scriptures we read, “God saw all things
which He had made and behold, they were very good” (Gen.i.3)
and things which receive the same praise must be of equal hon-
our in the eyes of the praiser.
This passage seems to indicate the existence of different types of matter. Here Philo
is influenced by the Septuagint account; in which man is created from a mixture of
materials, such as mud and pneuma (breath). The passage echoes Plotinus’ comment
at Enn. 3.2.11.6 that a craftsman could not make an animal only with eyes, even if
these are its finest feature. The beauty of the cosmos lies in its instantiation of all pos-
sibilities, and even though some of these possibilities may appear better than others,
God has applied the same skill in creating everything.
This point is picked up at De Prov. 59 when Philo states that the creation of
reptiles has not come into being by a direct act of Providence but as an attendant cir-
cumstance. Philo adopts the response used also by Christian thinkers in explaining
why God has created wild animals (they encourage bravery) at De Prov. 56-58.
Philo’s response is more systematic, however. Worms and lice cannot be blamed on
the Demiurge, but occur for scientific reasons (putrefaction in food and perspira-
tion).16 Just as Plato asserts that only what is good can be attributed to God,
Providence is only responsible for that which is created “out of its proper substance
by a seminal and primary process of nature”. Philo also adopts the Stoic approach that
apparent evils, upon closer inspection, turn out to be beneficial, when he points out
the utility of many venomous animals in medicinal processes at De Prov. 60f.
The Logos goes on to allocate various portions to humanity at Heres 180:
Further, nature abounds in things which bear some shape or
stamp and others which do not, even as it is with coins, and you
may note how the indivisible severer divides them all into equal
parts and awards those that are approved by their stamp to the
lover of instruction, but those that have no stamp or mark to the
man of ignorance. 
It appears that Philo is advancing a proto-Gnostic viewpoint here, in his view of a
Demiurge who distributes two different qualities of goods to two different classes of
humanity. I think, however, that Philo is drawing a very Platonic distinction. The
image of the stamp is similar to his use of the seal at Opif., and refers to those ele-
ments of the phenomenal realm which are made after the image of the Logos (in
Platonic terms, an instantiation of a Form). Therefore it seems that the Logos distrib-
utes to men of ignorance that which is purely material.
Philo seems to have a Stoicized reading of the Timaeus in mind at Heres
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than a mere tool or knife used by God during creation. It is a mediating entity, which
functions as a co-Creator and plays an active role in the universe after genesis,
although it does not compromise God’s unity.24
This is reiterated at Heres 236, where Philo indicates that not only is the
Father indivisible, but that this characteristic is possessed by the Logos also. It is par-
ticularly interesting that Philo should attempt to preserve this sort of “unity in the sec-
ond degree”, since it indicates that the Logos is not based on the Platonic dyad.
(Indeed, it is a masculine entity and has more in common with the World-Soul). One
of the advantages in numerous metaphysical systems for postulating secondary gods
is that it allows postulation of further hypostases, but Philo, as a monotheist, is very
keen on preserving a united godhead, even as regards secondary divine entities. In
spite of Philo’s claim that the Logos is a secundus deus, it very clearly is not, in the
original Numenian sense of the term. Numenius’ Second God is divided by matter,
whereas although the Philonic Logos is the sole cause of the division of matter, Philo
is at pains to point out that it is not divided by it.
On two occasions, Philo refers to the Logos as an instrument used by God
in the creation of the world. At Leg. All. III, 31, 96, we are told that God “used it like
an instrument when He was making the world” and “when He was fashioning the
world, He used it as an instrument , so that the arrangement of all the things He was
completing might be faultless”. On three occasions, the role of the Logos as an instru-
ment is implied. It is that “through which  the world was produced at Sacr. 3,8, Spec.
I, 16, 81) or that “by which” God made the world at Immut. 12, 57.25 This is similar
to the role played by Wisdom during creation. In The Wisdom of Solomon, the author
treats wisdom as equivalent to the Logos of God, although he refers to it as “God’s
daughter”. Wisdom is equally “that through which the world came into existence”
(De Fuga 20 &109) or “was brought to completion” (Quod Deterius Potiori Insidiari
16 & 54). Wisdom additionally is the title given to what seems to be the Philonic
equivalent of the Receptacle at Ebr. 8, 31, where it is called the “mother and nurse of
the all”.
The Logos functions in the typical role of a divine mediator, insulating God
from the disorder (in Philo’s case, evil might be a little too strong) inherent in mat-
ter:
When out of that [shapeless and quality less matter] God pro-
duced all things, He did so without touching it himself, since it
was not lawful for His nature, happy and blessed as it was, to
touch indefinite and confused matter but instead He made full
use of the incorporeal powers, well denoted by the name of
ideas to enable each genus to take its appropriate shape. (Spec.
I. 329, trans. Wolfson).
This mode of creation is echoed when God calls upon his powers to aid Him in the
forming of Man. These incorporeal powers which allow matter to take a shape do not
The division of the Logos-cutter should not be viewed as a crude creational
mechanism. As Radice has shown, the Logos engages in a very complex process.18 1)
It engages in actual division (Heres 133 – 140). 2) It engages in a secondary, equal-
ising division (Heres 141 – 200). 3) Mediation (Heres 201- 206) is followed by 4) the
placing of the divided components (Heres 207 -229) and finally 5) the non-division
of noetic reality (Heres 230 -236). This creation is part of a whole sequence of the
ordered and proportional construction of subordinate structures. For example, the
heavy cosmic substance becomes separated into earth (dry) and water (wet), while the
light forms air (cold) and fire (hot). Earth is divided into continents and islands, while
water is drinkable and undrinkable. This reveals not just a continual division of cos-
mic substance, but a logical division that itself is responsible for cosmic structure.19
In this sense, the Logos is a mediator, not just between the First Principle
and the rest of creation, but an equaliser in terms of size (§§ 147 -150; night and day,
the equinoxes, both poles etc.) as well as in terms of proportion (§§ 152f; between the
four elements in the cosmos or between the four constituent factors (dry, wet, cold
and hot) in Man). This can, naturally, be viewed as a development of the notion of
creation as a transition from disorder to order expressed at Tim. 30A (cf. Her. 133)
and unity based upon the harmony of proportions reflected at Tim. 31 A – 32 A. To a
great extent this notion of division is also echoed at Sophist 253 D-E.
This structured approach to creation by division is a metaphysical necessity
in Philo’s scheme. Although Philo does not recognise an atom, in the sense of a par-
ticle which cannot be further divided, he does recognise the absurdity of an infinite
division on the part of the Logos. For this reason intellects and noetic reality are not
divided by the Logos.20 Philo finds biblical justification for this approach in the com-
ment on Abraham’s sacrifice at Gen. 15:10: “but the birds he did not divide”. This is
what Philo means when he states that the Logos “never ceases to divide, for when it
has gone through all sensible objects down to the atoms and what are called indivis-
ibles, it begins from them again to divide those things contemplated by reason into
inexpressible and indescribable parts.” (Heres 26). By things contemplated by reason,
Philo is not referring to the noetic realm, rather sub-atomic particles which although
they may not be humanly divisible can still be reduced by the Logos.
This system of creation is complemented by agricultural imagery at De
Plantatione.21 This is drawn from the notion of God as a cultivator at Republic X
597C –D8. The cosmos can be considered like a living creature or farm which
requires continual tending on the part of God. However, that this image is not a model
for an alternative type of creation, but only an alternative explanation of creation is
illustrated by the fact that this creation is still fundamentally one of transition from
order to disorder. If the earth is composed of the heavier elements (water and earth)
at the centre, and the lighter ones (water and fire) at the exterior, this leads to the
question of how these elements do not neutralise one another through their close
proximity.22 This is the effect of the mediating presence of the Logos.23
This reveals the complex nature of Philo’s conception of the Logos. It is more
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NOTES
1De Opificio Mundi. 18 "Then taking up the imprints of each object in his own soul
like in wax, he carries around the intelligible city as an image in his head.
Summoning up the representations by means of his innate power of memory and
engraving their features even more distinctly on his mind, he begins as a good
builder, to construct the city out of stone and timber, looking at the model and ensur-
ing that the corporeal objects correspond to each of the incorporeal Ideas." (trans.
David Runia, Philo of Alexandria: On the Creation of the Cosmos According to
Moses, Introduction, Translation and Commentary , (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2001). 
2Opif. 20.
3Opif. 24: “The intelligible cosmos is nothing else than the Logos of God as he is
actually engaged in making the cosmos. For the intelligible city is nothing else than
the reasoning of the architect as he is actually engaged in the planning of the foun-
dation of the city.” (trans. David Runia).
4David M. Hay, “Philo’s Treatise on the Logos-Cutter” in Studia Philonica II
(Providence: Brown University Press, 1973), 19.
5T.H. Tobin, “Was Philo a Middle Platonist? Some Suggestions” in Studia Philonica
Annual V (Providence: Brown University Press, 1993), 149.
6Ibid.
7Translations, unless otherwise specified, are from F.H. Colson and G.H. Whitaker,
eds. & trans., Philo of Alexandria, (London: Loeb Classical Library, 1929-1934), vol-
umes I-V.
8This parallel is made more explicit at Heres 235 “The divine Word separated and
apportioned all that is in nature. Our mind deals with all the things material and
immaterial which the mental process brings within its grasp, divides them into an
infinity of infinities and never (oudepote) ceases to cleave them.” 
9This notion is developed at Quis Rerum Divinarum Heres 13.
10Cf. Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta 1. 120.
11Heres 153 propounds the notion that man is a compound generated by an equitable
mixture of his components by the Logos.
12John Dillon, “Reclaiming the Heritage of Moses, Philo’s Confrontation with Greek
Philosophy” in Studia Philonica VII, (Providence: Brown University Press, 1995),
[hereafter Dillon, Reclaiming the Heritage], 118.
13“infinite secari atque dividi”. Ap. Cicero. Acad. Post. 27.
14Heres 225.
15Heres 158.
16De Prov. 59.
17Dillon, Reclaiming the Heritage, 118.
18Radice, R. “Platonismo e Creationismo in Filone di Alessandria” (= Metafisica del
platonismo nel suo sviluppo storico nelle filosofia patristica 7), (Milan:
Pubblicazioni delle Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 1989), 67.
themselves become enmattered (unlike the Man of the Poimandres). Although it may
not be lawful for God to act directly upon matter, this does not prevent Him from dis-
pensing benefits directly to mortals (Leg. All. III, 178). These incorporeal powers
which assist in creation would seem to reflect the influence of the Stoic doctrine of
efficient causes rather than the Platonic theory of ideas (though in the Phaedo the
Ideas have a causal function).
Conclusion
With the emergence of Neoplatonism, such speculations on the tools required by a
Craftsman-god ceased to play an important role in philosophical debate, with the
alternative image of world-generation propounded by Plotinus of “procession” and
“return” to the supreme Principle. For Plotinus, the supreme principle (“the One”) did
not require tools to produce anything – it just occurred spontaneously. Neither did he
deliberate before generation, since this would imply hesitation. Although Plotinus
does posit hypostases before sensible matter is reached, these are not characterised as
“tools”. In his view, the One produces a power in an unformed state, which success-
fully orders itself in response to its contemplation of the One. Unlike the Demiurge,
the One does not toil at the task of producing the cosmos, and does not look down-
wards to what it has produced. 
The Logos-Cutter is a distinctively Philonic concept, effectively combin-
ing elements from Platonic and Judaic sources and playing a major role in Philo’s
mission to explain Mosaic doctrine in the language of Greek philosophy. Philo stress-
es that it pervades those areas of the cosmos where it was beneath God’s dignity to
go and the Logos is often described in biblical terms - as the sword of the Cherubim
or an angel. However, the Logos functions in a similar manner to a Platonic
Demiurge, engaging in a complex process of imposing order upon disorder to
improve the intelligibility of the cosmos, rather than strictly creating.
Despite speculations in certain Gnostic texts on a saw of God, the
hypostases posited by this tradition are not normally regarded as instruments, but as
aspects of God or the Church. Indeed Sophia, which one might imagine to be the
Wisdom of God, and therefore a counterpart of Philo’s Logos-Cutter, is in fact char-
acterised as an imperfect female entity, whose irrational desire to know the Father
triggers a series of events, resulting in the birth of an evil (or in some sects merely
ignorant) Demiurge, who then constructs the world. Surprisingly, the Demiurge of the
highly mythologized systems of Gnosticism does not usually have tools, while more
observations on this point were made in the realm of “serious” or mainstream phi-
losophy. And perhaps that is one of the strongest arguments for viewing the highly
evocative imagery of the “tools” of God as produced for serious metaphysical, rather
than purely stylistic, reasons.
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